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Abstract 
 
The continued difficulties of the World Trade Organization to achieve further multilateral 
trade liberalization in the Doha Round negotiations have raised questions about its 
continued relevance. This paper firstly identifies and assesses the key developments in the 
Doha Round that have contributed to the present stalemate. Secondly, it presents several 
options that the organization could consider for defining its future work program, given the 
new realities of global economic engagement, especially the emergence of global production 
networks. Most importantly, the paper assesses the possibility of including new disciplines 
covering areas that can help the growth of these drivers of global economic integration. Such 
an initiative could include three sets of issue: trade facilitation measures, an equitable 
investment regime, and effective disciplines for curbing non-tariff barriers. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The multilateral trading system, long considered to be the first best option for 
liberalizing global trade, faces the most serious challenge in its six and a half decades 
of existence. The inability of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to deliver its promise 
to deepen and widen trade liberalization, an exercise this forum had initiated nearly 12 
years ago, has raised questions about its continued relevance. And, yet, the reality 
remains that the WTO is the only organization that can take a comprehensive view of 
the increasing complexities of the evolving economic engagements between countries. 
The challenges the global community faces in this context are twofold. Firstly, there is a 
need to identify and assess the key developments in the Doha Round that have 
contributed to the present stalemate. Secondly, it is imperative to identify the options 
that the organization could consider for defining its future work program, given the new 
realities of global economic engagement. Since the start of the Doha Round 
negotiations, the drivers of economic integration have undergone significant changes. 
The most prominent of these is the emergence of global production networks (GPNs) 
as the drivers of economic integration between countries. The most compelling 
evidence in this regard is provided by South East Asia, the most integrated of all the 
regions. The shift from localized to fragmented production systems requires new 
approaches that the WTO must take cognizance of. 
This paper addresses the two sets of issues indicated above and is divided into three 
sections. The first section of the paper focuses on the key developments in the Doha 
Round encompassing some of the more critical negotiating areas. An exercise of this 
nature is important, in our view, since it helps in analyzing the issues on which 
agreement has eluded the WTO Members. Thus, if the Doha Round is to be brought to 
an early conclusion, an objective shared by the major economies, the disagreements 
between the key players involved in the negotiations must receive focused attention. 
There is no gain in saying that the global economic recovery, which is on a knife-edge, 
would need the backing of a resilient multilateral trading system to get onto a more 
sustainable path. 
Among the negotiating areas, agriculture and non-agricultural market access (NAMA) 
have been consistently in focus. More recently, and particularly since 2008, the 
discussions in agriculture and NAMA have centred on the Draft Modalities Texts tabled 
by the respective Chairs of the Negotiating Groups on Agriculture and NAMA in 
December 2008. Services and intellectual property rights are two issues that are of 
considerable importance for several developing countries as give rise to several critical 
concerns. In both these areas, developed counties have traditionally been the 
demandeurs, but in more recent years, and particularly since the beginning of the past 
decade, developing countries have been quite active in putting their own agendas on 
the table. 
In the second section, we discuss the functioning of the dispute settlement mechanism 
of the WTO, one of the most prominent elements of the organization. The Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU) adopted at the end of the Uruguay Round 
negotiations established rules for the settlement of disputes between WTO Members. 
The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) established by the DSU distinguishes the WTO 
from other multilateral institutions as it provides the organisation with the necessary 
powers to resolve disputes between Member states. However, despite having included 
these features, architects of the WTO felt that the dispute settlement rules needed an 
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early review.1 The review process was initiated in 1997 through informal consultations 
conducted by the Chairperson of the DSB.2 This process was unable to yield results 
and therefore review of the DSU was included in the mandate of the Doha Round.3
In the final section, we dwell on the proposition that a possible way forward for the 
WTO is to reflect on the manner in which the rules of the organization might 
accommodate and support the new reality of GPNs, and assess the possibility of 
including new disciplines covering areas that can help the growth of these drivers of 
global economic integration. Such an initiative could include three sets of issue—trade 
facilitation measures, an equitable investment regime, and effective disciplines for 
curbing non-tariff barriers (NTBs). 
 We 
shall point out that this review process provided the WTO Members with an opportunity 
to reflect on the problems they have encountered while using the dispute settlement 
rules. 
2. KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE DOHA ROUND 
The time that has elapsed since the start of these negotiations is testimony to the fact 
that the Doha Round has been the most vexatious of all the negotiating Rounds the 
multilateral trading system has witnessed since its establishment in 1948. Hindsight 
would perhaps suggest that this state of impasse was not entirely unexpected since 
developing and developed countries had widely differing perceptions on the future 
agenda of the WTO, which was primarily responsible for the failed Ministerial 
Conference in Seattle in 1999. The developing countries essentially focused on two 
sets of issues: one, rebalancing the Uruguay Round Agreements to make them more 
development-friendly, and two, ensuring that these Agreements were effectively 
implemented.4 On the other hand, the developed countries led by the United States 
(US) and the European Union (EU), were keen to launch a new Round of negotiations 
and expand the scope of the WTO by introducing issues like labor standards.5
The agreement among the WTO Members to launch the Doha Round was a 
compromise between the positions held by the developing countries and the developed 
countries. This was reflected in the negotiating mandate that had the following 
dimensions: (i) comprehensive review of the Uruguay Round Agreements; (ii) review of 
 
                                               
1 The decision was taken "... to complete a full review of dispute settlement rules and procedures under 
the World Trade Organization within four years after the entry into force of the Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization ..." In other words, the review was to have been completed by 1 January 
1999. See, GATT (1994). 
2 Informal consultations were held by the Chairman of the DSB in 1997, signalling the commencement of 
DSU review. For details, see WTO (1998). 
3 WTO (2001a), paragraph 30. 
4 According to Robert Wolfe, ‘“implementation” in WTO jargon means both that developing countries find it 
too hard to meet their Uruguay Round commitments quickly, despite the Special and Differential 
treatment provisions; and that developed countries have been too slow in meeting their obligations to 
developing countries.”. See, Wolfe (2004). The preamble to the Doha Ministerial Decision on 
“Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns,” states that the Decision was adopted as a “concrete 
action to address issues and concerns that have been raised by many developing-country Members 
regarding the implementation of some WTO Agreements and Decisions, including the difficulties and 
resource constraints that have been encountered in the implementation of obligations in various areas.” 
(WTO 2001b). 
5 WTO (2002a) and House of Representatives (1999). 
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implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements 6
A fourth crucial outcome of the Doha Ministerial Conference was the Declaration on the 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and 
Public Health.
; and (iii) expansion of the 
negotiating mandate of the WTO. The review of the existing agreements had, in turn, 
two components: one, deepening the level of commitments of WTO Members to the 
unshackling of their domestic markets, and, two, rebalancing the agreements keeping 
in view the needs of the developing countries. 
7 This Declaration was a response to the submissions made by the 
developing countries that provided evidence to show that the implementation of the 
Agreement on TRIPS was adversely affecting access to medicines. The Declaration 
introduced several flexibilities that could be used by WTO Members to address the 
problem of access to medicines.8
For the best part of the Doha Round, the focus of the negotiations has been on three 
sectoral issues—agriculture, NAMA, and services. The impetus to focus on these areas 
was market access ambitions across groups of countries. Thus, while developed 
countries have been seeking enhanced access to the markets of their developing 
country partners in both agriculture and NAMA, some developing countries, like India, 
have long maintained that they have a substantial interest in services trade 
liberalization. 
 
2.1 Doha Negotiations on Agriculture: Rebalancing the 
Agreement on Agriculture 
Agriculture negotiations in the Doha Round are being guided by two sets of mandates. 
The first set of mandates provided in Article 20 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture 
(AoA) has three clear guidelines. First, Members are expected to take into account 
their experience of implementing the reduction commitments (made at the end of the 
Uruguay Round), which spanned the three “pillars” of the AoA. Second, Members are 
to consider the effects of the reduction commitments on world trade in agriculture. 
Finally, Members are expected to take note of “non-trade concerns, special and 
differential treatment to developing country Members, and the objective to establish a 
fair and market oriented agricultural trading system.” The above-mentioned mandate 
was reinforced by the Doha Ministerial Declaration, wherein it was agreed that the 
negotiations should be aimed at: (i) substantial improvements in market access; (ii) 
reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies; and (iii) 
substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support.9
                                               
6 As mandated by the “Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns”. See, WTO (2001b). 
 It was further stipulated 
that special and differential treatment for developing countries would be an integral part 
of all elements of the negotiations and would be embodied in the schedules of 
concessions and commitments and as appropriate in the rules and disciplines to be 
negotiated, so as to be operationally effective and to enable developing countries to 
effectively take account of their development needs, including food security and rural 
development. 
7 WTO (2001c). 
8 The Ministers agreed that the "TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from taking 
measures to protect public health". They added that "the Agreement can and should be interpreted and 
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members' right to protect public health and, in particular, 
to promote access to medicines for all", WTO (2001c), paragraph 4. 
9 WTO (2001a), paragraph 13. 
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Although the mandate for the review of the AoA seems quite comprehensive, there are 
two sets of lacunae that ought to be pointed out. Firstly, the review of the subsidies 
discipline spoke of "substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support."10 This 
meant that the negotiations were to focus on only two forms of agricultural subsidies 
that were deemed to be "trade distorting"—price support and input subsidies. All other 
forms of domestic support, which the AoA had labelled as "Green Box" payments were 
excluded from the purview of the negotiations. Thus, the Doha mandate legitimized the 
false distinction that the AoA had made between agricultural subsidies by categorizing 
them as "trade distorting" or otherwise, even when the latter category included several 
forms of subsidies, which created distortions in agricultural markets.11 The impact of 
this categorization of subsidies introduced by the AoA was that the large providers of 
agricultural subsidies in the developed countries shifted their subsidies onto the "Green 
Box,"12
The second lacuna in the mandate relates to market access, which does not take on 
board the problem of the growing incidence of NTBs in agricultural trade
 thereby insulating their domestic support policies from the subsidies disciplines.  
13
2.1.1 Role of developing country coalitions in the agriculture negotiations 
. This lacuna 
is particularly galling in light of the fact that the Doha mandate provides that 
negotiations on market access for non-agricultural products would include NTBs. How 
critical this omission can be from the point of view of reforming agricultural markets 
would be indicated in a later section. 
One of the features of the negotiations on agriculture has been the strong coalition 
building between the developing countries. Faced with a situation where the two 
dominant players in the global agricultural markets, namely the US and the EU, were 
reluctant to reform their domestic policies, especially their subsidies regime, to their 
farm sector, major developing countries led by Brazil and India formed the Group of 
Twenty (G–20) coalition14 that played a determining role in the negotiating dynamics. 
The base paper, which marked the emergence of the G–2015
                                               
10 WTO (2001a), paragraph 13. 
, emphasized the point 
that the negotiations in the Doha Round should establish a fair and market-oriented 
trading system through fundamental reform in agriculture. The interventions made by 
this group have had two substantive dimensions. One, domestic support, including 
capping and/or reducing "Green Box" agricultural subsidies granted by some of the 
more prominent Members of the WTO, has to be substantially reduced and eventually 
removed, and, two, special and differential treatment for developing countries should 
be an integral part of the negotiations, and that non-trade concerns should be taken 
into account.  
11 Principal among these is direct income support to agricultural producers. This handout from the 
government enabled the producers to drive a wedge between the costs and prices, thus enabling them 
to sell their products below economic costs. 
12 The changed character of US subsidies' regime is the best illustration of the phenomenon of "box-
shifting". The notifications submitted by the US to the WTO show that in 1995, "Green Box" subsidies 
accounted for 46% of its total domestic support; in 2010, the corresponding figure was 93%. 
13 The rise in non-tariff barriers can be gauged from the fact that while in 1995, the WTO Members had 
issued less than 200 notifications on sanitary and phytosanitary measures, in 2013, this figure had 
exceeded 1200.  
14 Current Membership of G–20: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, the People’s Republic of China, Cuba, 
Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, 
South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zimbabwe. 
15 WTO (2003a). 
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The latter element, in the view of the G–20, was to be addressed in the revised AoA 
through two mechanisms. First, products that are critical for realizing the objectives of 
food security, rural livelihoods, and rural development, the so-called Special Products, 
would not be subjected to any tariff cuts. Secondly, introduction of a Special Safeguard 
Mechanism (SSM) aimed at allowing developing countries to counter anticipated or 
actual import surges. The developing countries saw the Special Products and the SSM 
as measures that would help them in addressing the twin problems of food security and 
livelihood concerns in the face of mounting pressures to lower agricultural tariffs.  
Support for Special Products and SSM was lent by another group of developing 
countries, the Group of Thirty Three (G–33),16 which has focused solely on the need to 
include these two mechanisms in the AoA. 17  The G–33 argued that developing 
countries must have the right to designate as Special Products “at least 20% of its 
agricultural tariff lines” guided by an “illustrative, non-exhaustive, non-prescriptive, and 
non-cumulative list of indicators.”18 The treatment of the Special Products was spelled 
out as follows: (i) at least 50% of the tariff lines designated as Special Products by any 
developing country Member would not be subject to any tariff reduction commitment; 
(ii) 25% of the tariff lines designated as Special Products would be subjected to a 5% 
reduction on bound import tariff rates; and (iii) the remaining tariff lines would be 
subjected to reduction on bound import tariff rates of no more than 10%. As regards 
SSM, G–33 argued that additional duty for guarding against actual or potential surges 
in imports could be imposed in respect of any agricultural product.19
The proposals of the G–20 aimed at reforming the structure of disciplines in the AoA 
stand to reason on account of the fact that the tariff reductions of the kind that the US 
and the EU have been demanding are possible only after distortions caused by the 
subsidies are substantially reduced in the markets for agricultural commodities. The 
large doses of subsidies provided by the US and the EU in particular, gave rise to 
uncertainties in the markets, as international prices have become more volatile as a 
result. At the same time, the G–20/G–33 proposals for inclusion of concrete 
mechanism such as lower tariff cuts, Special Products, and SSM had to be provided for 
in the revised AoA, so that some of the key concerns of the developing countries, in 
particular those related to food security and livelihoods, are addressed effectively. 
 
The two coalitions of developing countries mentioned above have had a substantial 
impact on the negotiating dynamics. Their key proposals, particularly in respect of the 
Special Products and SSM, have become an integral part of the negotiations, although 
there is considerable disagreement among WTO Members as to how the SSM is to be 
designed.  
Agriculture negotiations have made very slow progress given the wide range of 
differences between the major protagonists. However, the successive Chairs of the 
Committee on Agriculture have tried to steer the negotiations so as to broker a deal. 
The latest in this process was the draft modalities that were tabled by then Chairman of 
                                               
16 Current Membership of G–33: Antigua & Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, the 
People’s Republic of China, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, the Republic of 
Korea, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, 
Philippines, St Kitts & Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent & the Grenadines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Suriname, 
Tanzania, Trinidad & Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
17 WTO (2003b). 
18 WTO (2006). 
19 WTO (2005a). 
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the Committee on Agriculture, Crawford Falconer in July 2008. A revised version of 
these modalities is currently being considered by the WTO Members for sealing a deal 
on agriculture.20
2.1.2 Key Elements of the Falconer Modalities 
 
The Falconer modalities provide a comprehensive framework for revising the AoA. 
However, the modalities seem to be falling short of realizing the overall objectives of 
the agriculture negotiations, as set out in the negotiating mandate in the Doha 
Ministerial Conference, as we shall indicate below. 
In case of domestic support, a tiered approach to reducing the levels of support was 
adopted, aimed at targeting countries granting higher levels of “trade distorting 
subsidies.” Accordingly, the reduction in domestic support was proposed at several 
levels. First, reduction in “overall trade distorting domestic support” was proposed. The 
term “overall trade distorting domestic support” or OTDS was used to expand the ambit 
of “trade distorting support” so as to include a production limiting form of domestic 
support or so-called “Blue Box” support. 21
The proposed discipline on export competition includes elimination of export subsidies 
and export credits (with repayment periods beyond 180 days) by an end date to be 
decided during the negotiations. Operationally effective disciplines on food aid are also 
proposed to be established at the end of the negotiations. 
 Secondly, it was proposed that trade 
distorting support or “Amber Box” support would be reduced substantially, using a 
tiered approach. This approach would ensure that countries providing higher levels of 
subsidies would make greater reductions. Thirdly, product-specific support was 
proposed to be capped at their respective average levels. 
Two sets of views can be expressed in response to the disciplines on farm support 
proposed in the framework text. The first is that the proposed discipline on domestic 
support and export competition would be able to reduce subsidies to a considerable 
extent on two counts. One, the proposed discipline on domestic support not only seeks 
substantial reduction in the Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS), but also 
extends the discipline to cover the “Blue Box” measures that were hitherto left outside 
the AoA discipline. Two, there has been an agreement on the need to eliminate export 
subsidies and some forms of export credit, which is a major step forward given that the 
EU has been refusing to do so thus far. 
The second, which is the critical view on the proposed disciplines on farm support, is 
that the framework would not be effective in reining in the subsidies. The lack of 
discipline in respect of the “Green Box” measures, which contains several elements 
that can distort markets, would render the proposed domestic support discipline largely 
ineffective. We had indicated above that the “Green Box” measures account for nearly 
90% of US domestic support spending, while in case of the EU the corresponding 
figure was nearly 50%. Again, the agreement to eliminate export subsidies is a small 
consolation given that the EU, the largest user of this form of subsidies, made minimal 
use of them. 
In the area of market access, Falconer has proposed that developed countries would 
have to reduce their bound tariffs in equal annual installments over five years with an 
overall minimum average cut of 54%, while developing countries would have to reduce 
their bound tariffs by 36% over a ten-year period. 
                                               
20 WTO (2008a). 
21 WTO (2008a), page 4. 
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Both developed and developing Members would have the flexibility to designate an 
appropriate number of tariff lines as Sensitive Products, on which they would undertake 
lower tariff cuts. However, for these products, there has to be “substantial 
improvement” in market access, and so the smaller cuts would have to be 
compensated by tariff quotas for improving market access prospects. Developed 
countries would therefore have an opportunity to protect their commercially sensitive 
tariff lines.  
According to the Falconer proposals, developing countries would be able to “self 
designate” 12% of agricultural tariff lines as Special Products guided by indicators 
based on the criteria of food security, livelihood security, and rural development. The 
proposed average tariff cut on Special Products is 11%, including 5% of total tariff lines 
at zero cuts. This proposal falls short of the expectations of the major developing 
country groupings like the G–33, which had insisted that they should be able to “self 
designate” a minimum of 20% of tariff lines as Special Products, with at least half of 
these being subjected to zero tariff cuts. 
As regards the SSM, Falconer has proposed that either an import quantity trigger or a 
price trigger would trigger safeguard duties. The trigger for invoking the SSM 
determines when the safeguard duty can be imposed. It may be pointed out that if the 
import quantity trigger is set too high, the SSM would be rendered ineffective since the 
mechanism can be used only in the most exceptional circumstances. The same would 
hold true if the price trigger is set at too low a threshold. 
Discussions on the design of an SSM have focused on three issues: (i) the trigger, i.e., 
when the mechanism would be applicable; (ii) the size of the remedy, i.e., the 
magnitude of safeguard duties to be allowed; and (iii) duration of the remedy and 
whether safeguard duties could be applied in consecutive years. 
Discussions on SSM have been deeply divided largely because exporting countries 
have argued for very high initial triggers. For instance, one proposal was that the initial 
trigger should be fixed at 40%, in other words, imports have to be at least 140% of the 
imports in the previous period before safeguard duties can be imposed. The G–33 (and 
India) has argued that this was far too high a trigger, effectively denying them recourse 
to the SSM. 
2.1.3 Recent State of Play 
In the run-up to the Bali Ministerial, both G–33 and G–20 have identified areas in which 
they are looking for changes in the AoA. The former grouping has pushed for early 
agreement to address food security issues, while the latter is seeking clear directions 
for introducing new disciplines in the export competition pillar of the AoA, which 
includes the issues of export subsidies, export credits, and international food aid. 
G-33 Proposal on Food Security 
Towards the end of 2012, G–33 tabled a proposal for the inclusion of specific elements 
in the Draft Modalities, which could address the problem of food insecurity22
The first of the proposed amendments are aimed at allowing developing countries to 
make payments on specific activities to promote rural development and poverty 
alleviation without being subjected to any disciplines introduced by the AoA. The 
 through 
three amendments in the “Green Box” (Annex 2 of AoA). These proposals are not new, 
having been included in the Draft Modalities of 2008. By tabling the proposals now, G–
33 is aiming at an early decision at the Bali Ministerial. 
                                               
22 WTO (2012a). 
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proposal is to amend paragraph 2 of Annex 2 of AoA by including payments by 
developing countries for farmer settlement, land reforms, rural development, and rural 
livelihood security, such as provision of infrastructural services, land rehabilitation, soil 
conservation and resource management, drought management and flood control, rural 
employment programmes, nutritional food security, issuance of property titles, and 
settlement programmes. 
Secondly, G–33 proposed that the existing provisions relating to public stockholding for 
food security purposes should be amended to allow developing countries to spend on 
acquisition of stocks of foodstuffs for supporting low-income or resource-poor 
producers and the cost of so doing will not be accounted for in their subsidies’ bills. 
Two textual amendments that these countries have proposed would therefore allow 
developing countries to implement food security programmes “with the objective of 
fighting hunger and rural poverty” by procuring foodstuffs from the poorer farmers 
without being subjected to the AoA disciplines. 
G–20 Proposal on Export Competition 
One of the major decisions taken in the 6th Ministerial Conference held in Hong Kong, 
China in 2006 was that there would be “parallel elimination of all forms of export 
subsidies and disciplines on all export measures with equivalent effect … by the end of 
2013.”23 However, even as recently as in 2010–11, the EU and its Member states, 
which have been the largest user of export subsidies, had continued to use such 
subsidies.24
In view of the non-implementation of the commitment made by Members, the G–20 has 
proposed that a Ministerial Decision be adopted on Export Competition, which would 
include both export subsidies and export credits.
 
25
According to this proposal, by the end of 2013, developed country Members shall 
reduce their export subsidy commitments both in terms of outlay and quantity 
commitments as follows: (i) budgetary outlays shall be reduced by 50%, and (ii) export 
quantity commitments shall be reduced to the actual average of quantity levels in the 
2003–05 base period. 
 
As regards export credit, G–20 has proposed that the maximum repayment term for 
developed countries shall not be more than 540 days from the “starting point of credit”26
The proposed Ministerial Declaration includes “special and differential treatment” 
(S&DT) for developing countries. In case of export subsidies, developing countries 
would continue to benefit from the provisions of Article 9.4 of AoA
 
and end on the contractual date of the final payment. 
27
                                               
23 WTO (2005). 
 for five years after 
the end of all forms of export subsidies. Furthermore, the limit for repayments of export 
24 The outlay on export subsidies was about €177 million, while the quantity of subsidized products was 
nearly 2 million tonnes. As compared to 2009–11, there was a halving of its outlay on export subsidies, 
but quantity of subsidised exports had declined by a modest amount: from 2.5 million tonnes to 2 million 
tonnes. For details, see WTO (2013a) and WTO (2012b), Table ES.1. 
25 WTO (2013b). 
26 The "starting point of a credit" shall be no later than the weighted mean date or actual date of the arrival 
of the goods in the recipient country for a contract under which shipments are made in any consecutive 
six-month period. 
27 These include provisions for subsidies to reduce the costs of marketing exports of agricultural products 
and internal transport and freight charges on export shipments, provided or mandated by governments, 
on terms more favourable than for domestic shipments. 
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credit proposed for developed countries will be applicable to the developing countries 
three years after the former begin implementing it. 
2.2 Non-Agricultural Market Access 
The negotiations in the area of NAMA are being conducted with the mandate to 
“reduce or as appropriate eliminate tariffs, including the reduction or elimination of tariff 
peaks, high tariffs, and tariff escalation, as well as NTBs, in particular on products of 
export interest to developing countries.”28
Although the NAMA mandate gave direction to the WTO Membership to rein in NTBs, 
the focus of the negotiations in this area has been on reducing tariffs. In the initial 
phase of the negotiations, India, along with several other developing countries, favored 
only a moderate reduction in non-agricultural tariffs, which was more in keeping with 
the Uruguay Round approach.
 Furthermore, WTO Members had agreed that 
the negotiations would “take fully into account the special needs and interests of 
developing and least-developed country participants, including through less than full 
reciprocity in reduction commitments ...” 
29 In contrast, the US, the EU, and Canada set very high 
goals for tariff reduction across all countries, with the exception of the least developed 
countries (LDCs). 30
The US–EU–Canada paper was significant because it changed the dynamics of the 
NAMA negotiations. The developing countries, which were opposed to tariff 
harmonization, accepted this approach after they were allowed to keep some sensitive 
tariffs lines unbound. In other words, developing countries agreed to deep cuts in non-
agricultural tariffs across-the-board, except for sensitive products, on which relatively 
high tariffs could be imposed. 
 The approach of these countries (also called the “tariff 
harmonization” approach) was to ensure that tariffs on non-agricultural products are 
brought below a particular threshold (better known as the “coefficient”) using the “Swiss 
Formula.” In addition, they had argued for reducing the flexibilities available for 
developing countries. 
One important issue the NAMA negotiations have been dealing with is the use of 
NTBs. Most developed countries, but also some advanced developing countries, have 
been increasingly relying on NTBs, often as a border protection measure. An indication 
of the increase in NTBs can be obtained from the manner in which technical barriers to 
trade (TBT) have increased. In 1995, the year in which WTO was established, less 
than 400 notifications were issued, but by 2012 this number had increased to more 
than 2,100. This trend seems to suggest that WTO Member countries have increased 
their reliance on NTBs during a phase when tariff protection levels have been falling.  
In 2008, the Chairman of NAMA, Luzius Wasescha, made a series of proposals for the 
lowering of tariffs on non-agricultural products.31
The implications of the tariff cuts proposed by the NAMA Chairman on India and Brazil 
are provided in Table 1. The table shows that if the lowest coefficient were adopted, the 
 Three coefficients—20, 22, and 25—
were offered to developing countries, and the coefficient 8 was offered to developed 
countries. Importantly, for developing countries, a link between tariff reductions and 
flexibilities to keep tariff lines unbound was established. 
                                               
28 WTO (2001a), paragraph 16. 
29 WTO (2003c). 
30 WTO (2003d). 
31 WTO (2008b). 
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overall decrease in the bound tariffs of both countries would be relatively steep. In the 
case of India, the reduction of bound duties by 65% would bring average bound tariffs 
to 12% from about 34% at present. It may be argued that India can absorb this level of 
reduction given that the average of India’s applied tariffs is currently around 11%. 
Table 1: Reductions in Average Bound Duties Resulting from NAMA Chair’s 
Proposals 
Range of Coefficients India Brazil 
Coeff= 20 64.9 60.8 
Coeff= 22 60.4 58.6 
Coeff= 25 57.3 55.5 
Source: Author’s calculations. (figures in %) 
One issue that could introduce a significant element of uncertainty in the NAMA 
negotiations is that of sectoral zero-for-zero. This issue was included in the negotiating 
process through the so-called “July Framework” that helped to put the Doha Round on 
track in 2004 after the failed Ministerial Conference in Cancun. 32
Proponents of the sectoral zero-for-zero have justified the initiative on the grounds that 
it would help realize the NAMA negotiating mandate that emphasizes the need to 
“reduce or as appropriate eliminate tariffs.” However, several developing country 
Members have opposed the initiative arguing that they would end up taking more 
commitments for tariff cuts than their developed country partners. Their opposition 
would seem justified, as the Doha mandate stipulates that the commitments of 
developed country Members should be greater than those of their developing country 
partners. 
 Essentially, the 
sectoral initiative has involved WTO Members identifying sectors in which they are 
pushing for elimination of tariffs by a certain date. In December 2008, WTO Members 
listed 14 sectors for inclusion in the sectoral initiative (Annex Table). 
2.3 Services 
Trade in services was brought under the purview of multilateral trade negotiations 
during the Uruguay Round which established a kind of framework agreement, called 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), covering the entire gamut of 
services trade. But the achievement of the Uruguay Round in terms of the actual 
liberalization of services trade was rather modest. 
Nevertheless, GATS provides a “built-in agenda” requiring the Members to enter into 
successive rounds of negotiations aimed at progressive liberalization, with the first 
such round to begin no later than five years after the entry into force of the WTO 
agreement (i.e., 1 January 1995). Accordingly, GATS negotiations were re-launched in 
January 2000 and this new round of negotiations came to be known as the GATS 2000 
negotiations. The “Guidelines” for this negotiation had two mandates: (i) market access 
and (ii) rule-making. The GATS 2000 negotiations were subsequently subsumed under 
the Doha Development Agenda in November 2001. 33
2.3.1 GATS Negotiations on Market Access  
 Since then the GATS 2000 
negotiations have been proceeding as part of the Doha Round. 
In March 2001, the WTO Members adopted the modalities for the services 
negotiations, referred to as the “Negotiating Guidelines and Procedures.” The 
                                               
32 WTO (2004), page B-2. 
33 WTO (2001a), paragraph 15. 
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Guidelines stipulated the “request-offer” approach as the main method of negotiating 
new “specific commitments.” Importantly, the Guidelines also recognised the need to 
provide an appropriate degree of flexibility to developing countries.  
Initially negotiations adopted the bilateral request-offer approach. Under this approach, 
one country requests other countries to undertake commitments in particular sectors 
and modes of commercial interest. Revised requests and subsequent offers by all 
Members continue to be submitted until the commitments entered into can be adopted 
as final schedules. In other word, the bilateral request-offer approach involves a 
process of repeated reiteration—offer, negotiation, revision, resubmission, etc. The 
Doha Declaration also set out two important timelines for the negotiations: submission 
of initial requests by the Members by 30 June 2002, and “initial offers” by 31 March 
2003. Subsequently, the July 2004 Framework Agreement 34
Due to various reasons, some technical and some political, the bilateral approach failed 
to generate sufficient momentum as less than half of the WTO membership came forth 
with their offers for liberalizing their services sectors. Against this backdrop, the Hong 
Kong Ministerial Declaration of December 2005 mandated the adoption of a plurilateral 
“request-offer” approach as a complementary method of negotiations with the aim of 
expediting the market access negotiations on services.
 set May 2005 as the 
deadline for the submission of the “revised offers,” while urging the Members to submit 
the outstanding “initial offers” as soon as possible.  
35
2.3.2 GATS Negotiations on Rule Making 
 The Declaration called for 
plurilateral requests to be submitted by 28 February 2006. Accordingly, around twenty 
plurilateral groups had been formed in 2006, with the involvement of only around 35 
countries out of the then 149 Member countries of the WTO. This clearly reflects the 
fact that only the major players in services trade have come forward to participate in 
the plurilateral negotiations on services. As per the Ministerial Declaration, a recipient 
country of a plurilateral request is obliged to accept the request; it is only obliged to 
“consider” that request while submitting a new round of “revised offers.” However, the 
offer emanating from a plurilateral request is to be granted on an MFN basis to all WTO 
Members, not only to the demandeurs of that particular request.  
At the end of the Uruguay Round, the set of rules comprising the GATS Agreement 
remained incomplete with regard to certain important aspects, such as Emergency 
Safeguard Measures, Government Procurement, Subsidies, and Domestic Regulation. 
The future shape of the GATS will be determined by these rules to a great extent. 
Rules also assume significance in determining the effectiveness of the market access 
commitments undertaken by a Member country. A Member’s choice of domestic 
reforms is also likely to be influenced by rules. The negotiations on rules, however, 
have progressed quite slowly so far. This is due in part to the divergent views of the 
Members in different areas of rules and in part to technical and conceptual difficulties 
involved in each aspect of rules. 
Disciplining Domestic Regulation comprises one of the most critical areas of the rules 
negotiations under the GATS. The GATS explicitly recognizes the right of Members to 
regulate and introduce new regulations on the supply of services within their territories 
in order to meet their national policy objectives. Article VI: 4 of the GATS mandates the 
Members to develop disciplines aimed at ensuring that domestic regulatory measures 
do not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in services. This mandate covers the 
following issues: (i) Qualification Requirements and Procedures (QRP); (ii) Licensing 
                                               
34 WTO (2004), page C-1. 
35 WTO (2005), page C-3. 
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Requirements and Procedures (LRP); and (iii) Technical Standards (TS). Given the 
relatively advanced level of discussions on this issue, the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Declaration instructed the Members to finalize the disciplines on Domestic Regulation 
before the end of the 0044oha Round and as part of the single undertaking. 
Disciplining Domestic Regulation can go a long way in complementing market access 
particularly in the areas of interest to developing countries (including India). Challenges 
for enhancing market access in the developed countries under both Cross-border 
services trade (Mode 1) and Movement of Natural Persons (Mode 4) lie in the range of 
state-imposed regulatory barriers, including burdensome visa formalities, registration 
and licensing requirements, fee structure, stringent quotas and qualification 
requirements, discriminatory taxes, levies, and standards faced by service providers 
from developing countries. However, a counter concern of many Member countries, 
including in particular developing countries, relates to the issue of regulatory autonomy. 
It is widely apprehended that disciplines on Domestic Regulation under the GATS may 
encroach upon the sovereignty of Member countries by requiring trade considerations 
to supersede legitimate domestic policy objectives. Against this backdrop, all 
submissions stress the need to strike a balance between respecting a Member’s right 
to regulate, and curbing regulatory measures that could potentially undermine market 
access. 
Prior to the start of the Doha negotiations, WTO Members had agreed to Domestic 
Regulation in the accounting sector. 36 Subsequently, Members agreed to establish 
“horizontal” disciplines, which are not sector-specific and are applicable to all measures 
affecting trade in services. As in the case of market access negotiations, negotiations 
on Domestic Regulation remained mired in differences between the major protagonists 
despite the fact that several Members had underlined the importance of a satisfactory 
outcome on Domestic Regulation as a means of ensuring the effectiveness of 
scheduled commitments.37
3. FUNCTIONING OF THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
MECHANISM AND ITS REFORM AGENDA 
 At the same time, however, Members also observed that 
progress on Domestic Regulation disciplines had to be balanced with advances on the 
market access side of the services negotiations, and more broadly with progress in 
other areas of the Doha negotiations. 
One of the major achievements of the Uruguay Round negotiations was the adoption of 
the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), which provided rules for the settlement 
of disputes between WTO Members. The rules provided by the DSU were distinct 
improvements over those that existed under the GATT. Among the new rules was the 
so-called “reverse consensus” voting rule at key milestones in the dispute settlement 
process, legal review of panel reports by a permanent Appellate Body, establishment of 
deadlines for various phases of the dispute settlement process, and improved 
multilateral oversight of compliance. The general rules of the DSU apply to all the 
covered agreements. 
The introduction of the “reverse consensus” rule addresses one of the major 
weaknesses of the GATT dispute resolution system. In keeping with practice, reports of 
the dispute settlement panels were adopted by consensus. This practice effectively 
                                               
36 WTO (1998). 
37 WTO (2011), paragraph 76. 
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meant that the GATT panel reports could never be adopted. The “reverse consensus” 
rule, included in the dispute settlement understanding, provides that unless it decides 
by consensus not to do so, the dispute settlement body will (i) consider requests to 
establish panels, (ii) adopt panel and Appellate Body reports, and (iii) if requested by 
the prevailing Member in a dispute, authorize the Member to impose a retaliatory 
measure in case the defendant has not complied with the rulings of the panels and 
appellate body. 
The speed of the whole process is controlled by the principal disputing governments, 
the complainant, and the respondent, with the complainant in the driving seat, and 
takes about 15 months from filing the complaint to the final ruling.  
The setting of time lines for the settlement of disputes was another significant feature of 
the WTO DSU. According to Article 15 of the DSU, the duration from the filing of a 
complaint to the Appellate Body stage should be about 14 months, with the panel stage 
taking up more than three-fourths of this period. In practice, however, the time taken by 
the panels is substantially longer. The details will be discussed in the following section. 
Table 2: Main Stages in the Dispute Settlement System 
 (with respective time periods) 
Stage Description Timeline 
Stage 1 Bilateral consultations between the complainant and the respondent 2 months 
Stage 2 Legal examination: a panel of three legal experts approved by the disputing governments 6–9 months 
Stage 3 An appellate stage 2–3 months 
Stage 4 Implementation of the rulings subject to negotiation between the parties 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on WTO (2010). 
3.1 Implementation of the DSU: An appraisal 
The use of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism would provide an indication as to 
its usefulness for the membership, particularly the developing and the least developed 
countries. The following discussion will provide the details of the use that the WTO 
membership has made of the dispute settlement rules. 
Until February 2013, 456 disputes had been referred to the DSB.38
                                               
38 On February 2013, the United States notified the 456th dispute against India. 
 These disputes had 
been notified by 485 complainants, meaning there were several disputes involving 
multiple complainants. The trend of notification of disputes shows that after the initial 
enthusiasm, which saw 50 notifications recorded in 1997, there was a secular decline 
until 2011. In fact, of the total disputes between 1995 and 2012, almost 50% were 
notified in the first six years. This is one of the clearest indications that WTO Members 
were sceptical about the ability of the DSB to resolve their disputes.
ADBI Working Paper 444                           Dhar 
 
16 
   
Figure 1: Trend in the Initiation of WTO Disputes 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on WTO (2013). 
The use of the DSB was quite skewed, with the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) members (primarily developing countries) 
emerging as the largest users of the DSB. In almost 65% of the dispute cases, the 
complainant was a member of the OECD. Only once did a least developed country 
(LDC) approach the DSB as a complainant (Bangladesh vs. India). This group of 
countries had an even larger share among the respondents, with the share exceeding 
two-thirds of the total. OECD countries had the largest share of all respondents. While 
no complaint was brought against any of the LDC Members of the WTO, this group of 
countries participated in several disputes as third parties. This seems to be a positive 
development, for it would enable the LDC Members to prepare themselves for using 
the dispute settlement rules. 
Table 3: Participation of Groups of Countries in WTO Trade Disputes 
Country Groups As Complainant As Respondent As Third Party 
OECD members 313 (64.7%) 311 (66.3%) 829 (48.4%) 
Non-OECD members 170 (35.1) 158 (33.7%) 869 (50.7%) 
Least developed country 1 (0.2%) 0 15 (0.9%) 
Total 484 469 1,713 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on WTO (2013). 
The US and the EU were the largest users of the dispute settlement rules. About 40% 
of the all disputes brought before the DSB included one of these countries as a 
complainant. Brazil and India led the emerging economies in the use of the DSB, a list 
that also includes Argentina and Thailand. The People’s Republic of China, currently 
the largest trading nation, does not figure on this list. 
An important aspect of the countries invoking the dispute settlement rules is that the 
African continent has not initiated any disputes. Several countries in the region have 
faced severe trade discrimination, which has prevented some of the poorest countries 
from benefitting from the opening of markets since the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round. The major constraining factor for these countries had been their lack of 
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capacity to participate in the proceedings of the DSU, an issue that has figured 
prominently in the ongoing negotiations for the strengthening of the mechanism. 
Table 4: Top 10 Complainants 
C omplainant Number of Dis putes  
United States 105 
European Union 87 
Canada 33 
Brazil 26 
Mexico 23 
India 21 
Argentina 18 
Japan 17 
Republic of Korea 15 
Thailand 13 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on WTO (2013). 
In terms of the covered agreements in which the disputes were notified, more than a 
third of these involved adjudication based on the GATT articles. If the other areas that 
were included in the GATT framework prior to the establishment of the WTO are 
considered, including anti-dumping and safeguards, the share of the traditional GATT 
areas increases to nearly two-thirds. Of the GATT articles referred to in the disputes, 
the three key articles—Articles I (General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment), Article II 
(Schedules of Concessions), and Article III (National Treatment on Internal Taxation 
and Regulation)—were used the most (nearly 40%). This is not entirely unexpected 
since the commitments entered into by WTO Members under the various Uruguay 
Round agreements were built on the premise of non-discrimination vis-à-vis goods, 
service providers, and intellectual property owners, which is a major departure from the 
practices they had followed prior to their WTO accession. 
Less than a sixth of the notified disputes covered the four new areas included in the 
multilateral trading system—agriculture, intellectual property, services, and investment. 
These results are somewhat surprising since this set of areas includes some of the 
more contentious agreements, like agriculture and intellectual property. A possible 
reason could be that the agreements covering all these areas (except investment) are 
included in the Doha Round, and could therefore be a greater focus on the part of the 
WTO Members to address their contending objectives through re-negotiating the 
existing texts rather than to get an interpretation by the dispute settlement panels on 
which they have no influence. 
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Table 5: Broad Areas Covered in the Disputes 
Covered Area Share of total 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 4.7 
Agriculture 7.0 
Anti-dumping (Article VI of GATT 1994) 9.3 
Customs Valuation 1.5 
Dispute Settlement Understanding 1.5 
GATT 1947 0.1 
GATT 1994 36.0 
Government Procurement 0.4 
Import Licensing 3.8 
Intellectual Property 3.1 
Protocol of Accession 2.6 
Rules of Origin 0.7 
Safeguards 4.2 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 3.9 
Services 2.3 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 9.5 
Technical Barriers to Trade 4.4 
Textiles and Clothing 1.6 
Trade-Related Investment Measures 3.4 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on WTO (2013). 
Below we provide some facts regarding the use of dispute settlement rules by WTO 
Members, to get an indication about the ability of the DSB to efficiently settle disputes 
between Member states. 
As indicated above, 456 disputes had been referred to the DSB by February 2013. Of 
these, 452 took longer than the two months the DSU has provided for consultations 
between parties. In other words, either these disputes should have been settled by 
mutual consent, or requests for the setting up of panels should have been put forth. 
Available data on these 452 disputes shows that panels were set up in 235 cases, 
which roughly corresponds to 52% of total cases. In 43 of the total number of disputes, 
the parties found a mutually agreeable solution before the establishment of the panel. 
Thus, in less than 10% of the disputes notified, the parties involved found an 
acceptable solution at the consultations stage. A further 19 cases were decided by 
mutual consent after the establishment of a panel. This shows that in about one-
seventh of the total notified disputes, the parties found a solution before going through 
the panel proceedings. However, there were two cases, the Japan–US dispute on 
“Measures Affecting Agricultural Products” and the Turkey–India dispute on 
“Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products,” in which the parties found a 
mutually acceptable solution only after the Appellate Body had adjudicated. 
Of the complaints filed by non-OECD countries, mutually agreed solutions were found 
in only in 9% of the cases, which is nearly half of the corresponding figure in cases of 
disputes initiated by OECD countries. In terms of the advancement of the dispute 
settlement process through the panel process, the OECD countries fared much better. 
While the panels had submitted their reports in 54% of the disputes they had initiated, 
only 45% of non-OECD country Members’ dispute panels had submitted their reports. 
These figures clearly indicate that non-OECD Members of the WTO were able to get a 
better return on their efforts to resolve disputes with their partner countries. Once 
again, this may be due to developing countries being less well prepared for their 
involvement in the WTO dispute settlement process. 
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Although panels were established in 235 cases, the latest available information shows 
that panel reports were circulated in 185 cases. This relatively low number of panel 
reports circulated to Members is due in large part to inordinate delays in the process of 
adjudication. 
The time lines for the 185 cases in which the panels had submitted reports, gives the 
impression of a rather indifferent WTO DSB. In only four of the 185 disputes did the 
panels submit their reports within 11 months of the filing of the complaint as stipulated 
by the DSU. At the other end of the spectrum are 53 cases where the panels took more 
than two years to submit their reports. In three of these disputes, all of which involve 
the US and the EU, the panels took nearly five years to submit their reports. 
According to the DSU, the appellate body should be completing its proceedings within 
14 months of the initiation of the complaint. This time frame could be observed in four 
of the 124 disputes that went to the appellate stage. In about half of these disputes, the 
appellate body reports were submitted more than two years after the initiation of the 
complaint. In the two “Large Civil Aircraft” disputes involving the US and the EU, the 
appellate body reports took nearly seven months from the date of filing the complaint to 
be released. 
The functioning of the WTO DSU provides some telling insights into the nature of 
participation by developing countries. Not only was their level of participation much 
lower than that of their developed country counterparts, Africa, which has suffered 
trade discrimination over long periods, has not been able to use the dispute settlement 
rules. Participation in the proceedings of the DSB has also been relatively expensive 
for the developing countries. One indicator of this is that only a relatively small 
proportion of their complaints were resolved through mutually agreed solutions. Again, 
compared with the OECD countries, a larger proportion of the disputes initiated by the 
developing countries have not progressed up to the panel stage. 
3.2 Issues in the DSU Review 
Not surprisingly, therefore, developing countries have raised several problems 
regarding the DSU in the ongoing review of the mechanism. One of the most 
comprehensive proposals in this respect was presented by the African Group.39
                                               
39 WTO (2002b). 
 The 
group pointed out that the major problems countries from this region face in seeking to 
use the dispute settlement rules include the following: (i) rules are complicated and 
using them is overly expensive; (ii) injury suffered has not been satisfactorily 
compensated in situations where the offending measures are withdrawn before or after 
the commencement of proceedings; (iii) the means provided for enforcement of 
findings and recommendations (trade retaliation) are skewed against and disadvantage 
African Members; (iv) special procedures for developing country Members have not 
addressed the core difficulties African Members face in seeking to use the rules; (v) in 
their interpretation and application of the provisions, the panels and the Appellate Body 
have in several instances exceeded their mandate and fundamentally prejudiced the 
interests and rights of developing-country Members as enshrined in the WTO 
Agreement; (vi) the panel and Appellate Body composition and operation have not 
been conducive to ensuring the achievement of the development objectives of the 
WTO and of equity in geographical distribution; and (vii) any assessment and 
improvement of the DSU should be primarily based on the development objectives set 
out in the WTO Agreement. 
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Elaborating on some of the issues, the African Group argued that in order to participate 
effectively in the proceedings of the DSB, developing countries Members “will need 
supplementary resources and means to be provided to develop both the institutional 
and human capacity.”40
Other prominent developing countries have raised a number of issues, including the 
following: (a) a limit on the cases against developing countries each year (the People’s 
Republic of China’s view is no more than two per year); (b) reimbursing the costs of 
litigation to developing countries, especially in a case where they have won a 
favourable judgement (proposal from like-minded group of countries); (c) increased 
reasonable period of time (RPT) to developing countries for implementing the decisions 
of the panel and/or the Appellate Body; and (d) invoking of automatic cross retaliation 
in any sector by developing countries.
 The Group further pointed out that the “Advisory Centre on 
WTO Law should not be considered as a panacea for all institutional and human 
capacity constraints of developing countries” since its “terms of reference are equivocal 
in certain instances, and it does not cover all developing countries.”  
41
The last mentioned issue is important for developing countries that have not been able 
to retaliate, even if they obtained an authorization from the DSB. Ecuador obtained a 
right to retaliate in the EC–Bananas case,
  
42 but could not exercise its right. Likewise, 
India, the Republic of Korea, Chile, and Brazil did not retaliate in the US–Byrd case 
after having obtained the authorization to do so.43
Apart from the issues concerning developing countries, discussions on the reform of 
the DSU have focused on two key issues. The first is the so-called “sequencing” issue, 
provided in Article 21.5 of the DSU. This article authorizes the setting up of a 
compliance panel in the event of a disagreement between the parties as regards 
compliance by the responding party, but does not specify the time when action to set 
up the compliance panel will be triggered. On the other hand, Article 22.2 provides that 
if there is no agreement on satisfactory compensation between the parties within 20 
days of the expiry of the RPT granted to the responding party, the complaining party 
may request authorization to retaliate. These provisions could result in situations where 
the setting up of compliance panels has not been sought within 20 days of expiry of the 
RPT while the complaining party is obliged to request authorization to retaliate in order 
to preserve its right to retaliate. In other words, the sequencing between the 
establishment of a compliance panel to the disagreement between the parties in a 
dispute and the right to retaliate is not provided in the existing discipline. 
 
The second lacuna is the lack of remand procedures in the DSU. The DSU provides a 
division of responsibility between the panel and the AB—while the panel establishes 
the facts and makes legal findings, the AB can only consider matters of law and its 
                                               
40 WTO (2002b). 
41 Kaushik (2008), p. 28. 
42 The dispute was initiated in 1996 with Ecuador and four other countries, including the US, bringing a 
complaint against EU’s regime for the importation, sale and distribution of bananas. After the EU had 
failed to comply with the decision of the Panel and the Appellate Body, the arbitrators allowed Ecuador 
to initiate trade retaliation proceedings in the year 2000. However, a mutually agreed solution was found 
between the parties in 2001. For details see, WTO (1996), WTO (2000), and WTO (2001). 
43 The dispute was initiated in 2001 with nine countries (Australia, Brazil, Chile, the EU, India, Indonesia, 
Japan, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, Canada, Mexico) bringing a complaint against the Continued 
Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of the US (Byrd Amendment). After the Panel and Appellate Body 
ruled against the US, arbitration proceedings were initiated with six complainants (India, Japan, the EU, 
the Republic of Korea, Brazil, and Chile). However, only two of these complainants, Japan and the EU, 
took retaliatory actions against the US. For details, see WTO (2013d). 
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interpretation. Thus, any change in the legal interpretation when this is considering a 
dispute requiring new facts, which may facilitate resolution of the dispute, cannot be 
sought by the. Several countries have proposed textual amendments to rectify this 
lacuna.44
4. SUPPORTING THE GLOBAL PRODUCTION 
NETWORK: A PROACTIVE AGENDA 
 
Over the past two decades, Global Production Networks (GPNs) have emerged as a 
strong integrating force in the global economy. Not only have GPNs played a 
determining role in bringing economies closer together by stimulating the flows of 
goods and capital across countries, they have also contributed to knowledge diffusion, 
and have provided opportunities for local capabilities to emerge in countries that are 
part of the networks. This dimension has received relatively less attention in the 
literature on GPNs, which has discussed this new organizational form largely from the 
point of trade integration. 
GPNs have been seen both as products of the process of liberalization of trade and 
financial flows as well as the catalysts for ensuring greater degree of openness in the 
global economy. Proponents of this thinking have argued that the unshackling of 
economies has triggered a change in transnational corporations, converting them from 
“tariff-hopping” investors to “global network flagships” that have integrated their 
dispersed supply, knowledge, and customer basis into the GPNs. Fragmentation of 
production caused by the “network flagships” is assisted by the existence of a plethora 
of specialized suppliers, usually spread over a large geographical spectrum.45
The logic of GPNs demands a high degree of competence all along the supply chain. 
The suppliers to the network flagship, which is usually the point of assembly of the final 
product, are not only required to meet the exacting quality standards and the price of 
the intermediates they are responsible for; they would also have to meet this rigid “just-
in-time” schedule. But in order to ensure that the suppliers’ performances meet 
expectations, the network flagships need to transfer technical and managerial 
knowledge to them. There is therefore a need to upgrade the suppliers’ technical and 
managerial skills on a continuous basis. The increasing rate of product obsolescence 
seen in a large number of industries, in particular those producing products that use 
information and communications technology, put pressure on the network flagships to 
upgrade the technologies of their suppliers.
.  
46
Network flagships transfer knowledge across borders using a slew of mechanisms. 
Firstly, the transfer of knowledge may be mediated through market mechanisms, using 
licensing contracts and outright purchases of technology and plant equipment, among 
others, that may or may not involve foreign direct investment (FDI). Secondly, the 
network flagship may transfer technologies through the supply chain and in doing so 
would be exercising control over the manner in which the knowledge is disseminated to 
and used by the supplier. The type of control over the supply chain can be seen by the 
manner in which the operation of original equipment manufacturers, or the so-called 
“Tier I” suppliers, are managed by the network flagships. 
 
                                               
44 See for instance, the joint proposal by Argentina, Brazil, Canada, India, New Zealand, and Norway. 
WTO (2007). 
45 Ernst and Kim (2002), pp. 1,417–1,429. 
46 Bernhardt and Milberg (2011). 
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Irrespective of the nature of GPNs, i.e., whether they are producer driven or buyer 
driven, network flagships are able to control the production process of their suppliers by 
actively transferring knowledge in the form of blueprints and technical specifications. 
The objective is to ensure that the suppliers meet the technical standards of the final 
products. Branded marketers like Nike and Reebok, managing the “buyer driven” 
networks, maintain close control over their suppliers by setting standards, sourcing raw 
materials, distributing them, and finally importing the finished products. GPNs are also 
able to encourage firms figuring in the networks to access knowledge indirectly through 
indirect mechanisms, as for instance import of sophisticated equipment to improve their 
production capabilities.  
 With the maturing of production networks, the pattern of knowledge acquisition has 
also been undergoing changes. Along with this has come the phenomenon of firms in 
the GPNs engaging in innovations that take them across value chains thereby giving 
the innovating firms more scope to operate independently.  
The existence of successful GPNs, however, presupposes the existence of local 
suppliers that have the capabilities to absorb the knowledge disseminated by the 
networks. Furthermore, to remain in the GPN, local suppliers must constantly upgrade 
their absorptive capacity. Participation in GPNs cannot, therefore, be ensured unless 
the local suppliers are able to develop their technological capabilities and prepare 
themselves for inclusion in these networks. 
The proliferation of GPNs poses a significant challenge to the multilateral trading 
system for its basic construct is based on the existence of localized production within 
nation states. Production sharing across national borders of the kind that has been 
spawned by GPNs requires new instruments and institutions that are supportive of 
such networks. This, in our view, requires a focus on three behind-the-border areas—
trade facilitation measures, investment policy, and NTBs for the adoption of possible 
globally accepted frameworks and agreements.  
From the point of view of GPNs, justification for including trade facilitation in this group 
of issues is considerable. Enterprises figuring in the GPNs are required to meet tight 
delivery schedules. Transparent sets of rules and adequate infrastructure at the border 
are the necessary wherewithal that help them realize their objective. Reforms of the 
existing facilities offered in different jurisdictions with a view to harmonizing them to the 
extent possible given the resource constraints faced by developing countries in 
particular, are therefore a desirable set of outcomes. In fact, the negotiations on trade 
facilitation in the WTO are aimed at making progress in this direction. 
A multilateral agreement on investment became a non-starter after the OECD-backed 
proposal for such an investment agreement met with resistance not only in developing 
countries, but from within the group of developed countries. Notwithstanding this 
development, there has been an unrelenting movement towards adoption of a de facto 
investment agreement at the global level through bilateral investment treaties and 
economic partnership agreements. However, in recent years, it has become evident 
that such agreements are imposing a variety of constraints on host countries. Not 
surprisingly, there has been a steep increase in disputes involving foreign investors 
and their host states. This development could be detrimental to GPNs since they are 
dependent on cross-boundary movements of enterprises. A better understanding of the 
contentious elements of the existing investment agreements could trigger a move 
towards a more equitable global investment regime. 
NTBs have been the insurmountable barrier the multilateral trading system has had to 
cope with since its establishment. In more recent years, technical barriers have 
emerged as the fountainhead of NTBs. This was confirmed in the course of the 
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ongoing negotiations on non-agricultural market access. Taming the proliferation of 
these technical barriers or standards requires global action. 
Below we discuss the elements of each of these four areas, which could help in taking 
the GPNs to the regions that have been yet left untouched. 
4.1 Trade Facilitation 
Although several of its elements form part of the GATT, trade facilitation was unveiled 
as an integrated framework to address customs related issues, including that of transit, 
at the first WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore in 1996. The issue thus became 
one of the “Singapore Issues,” along with investment, competition, and government 
procurement. After much discussion, the issue was included in the WTO work 
programme in the Doha Ministerial Conference. While the other “Singapore Issues” 
were taken off the table in the Doha Round for want of consensus,47
Trade facilitations are mandated to produce an appropriate set of rules both from a 
technical point of view and from the perspective of the development imperatives of 
developing countries. In more precise terms, the negotiations “aim to clarify and 
improve relevant aspects of Articles V, VIII and X of the GATT 1994 with a view to 
further expediting the movement, release and clearance of goods, including goods in 
transit”.
 trade facilitation 
was included in the negotiations as a part of the “July package” in 2004. 
48 The negotiations are also aimed at enhancing “technical assistance and 
support for capacity building” and to develop “provisions for effective cooperation 
between customs or any other appropriate authorities on trade facilitation and customs 
compliance issues.” The negotiations are expected to “take fully into account the 
principle of special and differential treatment for developing and least-developed 
countries” and, in keeping with this spirit, the mandate clarifies that the countries in 
question are not expected “to undertake investments in infrastructure projects beyond 
their means.”49
Developing countries were initially opposed to the expansion of the remit of the WTO 
by including trade facilitation in the Doha agenda if adequate efforts were not made to 
address issues arising from the implementation of the Uruguay Round commitments. 
They questioned the developmental impact of trade facilitation, besides arguing that 
they did not have the resources to implement the commitments the proposed 
agreement would impose on them.  
 
However, despite the initial scepticism there seems to be an emerging consensus that 
developing countries would benefit from a WTO Agreement on trade facilitation. A 
widely accepted view is that in developing countries customs procedures and the 
supporting infrastructure are generally not very efficient, and that this results in higher 
transaction costs. “Doing Business,” the annual survey of the World Bank, provides 
endorsement of this point. 
Given the weight of evidence emerging in favor of the various elements of trade 
facilitation, including simplification and harmonization of customs procedures and 
improvement of border infrastructure and management systems, there is no doubt that 
                                               
47 In respect of each of the “Singapore Issues,” the Doha Ministerial Declaration had stated “that the 
negotiations will take place after the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference on the basis of a 
decision to be taken, by explicit consensus, at that Session on modalities of negotiations.” See WTO 
(2001a), paragraphs 20–27. 
48 WTO (2004a), D-1. 
49 WTO (2004a), D-1. 
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the introduction of these measures would not only increase developing countries’ 
capacity to trade, but businesses in these countries will also be able to integrate into 
global supply chains. Better coordination amongst the customs authorities would 
increase operating efficiency of the agency, and this in turn will enable the system to 
generate more revenue through a transparent mechanism. A recent study conducted 
by the OECD Secretariat using data on “trade facilitation indicators” from for 106 non-
OECD countries, which include 95 WTO Members and 11 WTO observers, showed 
that the benefits accruing to developing countries, both as importers and exporters, 
could be substantial if appropriate reforms are undertaken.50
The negotiations on trade facilitation have been dealing with a plethora of issues that 
could eventually form a part of the agreement. These include issues relating to 
transparency, like publication and availability of information through publication, 
internet and enquiry points, operational issues like the release and clearance of cargo, 
introduction of risk management and post clearance audit and disciplines on expedited 
shipments, and institutional issues like establishing a single window for clearance of 
goods, elimination of pre-shipment and post-shipment inspections, and uniform forms 
and documentation requirements for clearance of goods. Besides, the above-
mentioned freedom of transit and customs cooperation are key elements of the 
discussions. 
  
While the broad contours of an Agreement on trade facilitation seems clear,51
Despite the progress made in the trade facilitation negotiations, several obstacles 
stand in the way of an eventual agreement. Major developing countries like India and 
Brazil are not likely to favor a “stand alone” outcome, as trade facilitation is integral to 
the Doha package, and thus part of the “single undertaking”. In other words, these 
countries will be reluctant to agree on a deal on trade facilitation without agreement on 
some of the key areas in the Doha negotiating mandate. Again, while there is no doubt 
that most of the lesser developed countries would benefit from an eventual deal on 
trade facilitation, since the benefits would not accrue to them in the absence of the 
technical assistance and capacity building commitments from the developed countries, 
it seems unlikely that a globally acceptable outcome can be realized soon.  
 several 
contentious issues continue to engage WTO members. Developing countries have 
been insisting that there should be firm commitments on capacity building and technical 
assistance, which will enable them to tackle the challenge posed by the proposed 
agreement.  
4.2 Towards a Balanced and Equitable Investment Regime 
Like trade facilitation, a multilateral agreement on investment has also been on the 
fringes of the discussions in the WTO since the Singapore Ministerial Conference. The 
Doha Ministerial Conference in 2001 included trade and investment issue in the post-
Doha work program with the following mandate: “Recognizing the case for a 
multilateral framework to secure transparent, stable, and predictable conditions for 
long-term cross-border investment, particularly foreign direct investment, that will 
contribute to the expansion of trade, and the need for enhanced technical assistance 
and capacity-building in this area … and hence agreed that negotiations will take place 
after the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference on the basis of a decision to be 
taken, by “explicit consensus,” at that session on modalities of negotiations.”  
                                               
50 OECD (2012). 
51 For the most recent version, see WTO (2013e). 
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The Doha Ministerial Declaration also provided some indications regarding the nature 
of work the Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment (WGTI) 
was to undertake as follows: “In the period until the Fifth Session, further work in the 
Working Group on the relationship between trade and investment will focus on the 
clarification of: scope and definition; transparency; non-discrimination; modalities for 
pre-establishment commitments based on a GATS-type, positive list approach; 
development provisions; exceptions and balance-of-payments safeguards; consultation 
and the settlement of disputes between members. Any framework should reflect in a 
balanced manner the interests of home and host countries, and take due account of 
the development policies and objectives of host governments as well as their right to 
regulate in the public interest.”52
In the post-Doha discussions on a possible multilateral regime on investment, India, 
along with other developing countries, argued strongly in favor of the “need [for] policy 
flexibility to determine the form of investment that would lead to highest growth.” India 
made the point that the definition of investment would itself have important implications 
for the development prospects of developing countries.
 It was agreed that special development, trade, and 
financial needs of developing and least-developed countries should be taken into 
account as an integral part of any framework, which should enable members to 
undertake obligations and commitments commensurate with their individual needs and 
circumstances, with due regard to other relevant WTO provisions. It was also agreed 
that account should be taken, as appropriate, of existing bilateral and regional 
arrangements on investment. 
53
Arguments made against a multilateral regime on investment by developing countries 
led by India resulted in the eventual exclusion of investment issue from the Doha 
Round negotiations. A decision was taken by WTO Members in July 2004 that this 
issue “will not form part of the [Doha] Work Programme ... and therefore no work 
towards negotiations ... will take place within the WTO during the Doha Round.”
 It was pointed out that 
greenfield investments would be more conducive to furthering the developing goals 
than mergers and acquisitions, as investments of the former kind could result in better 
economy-wide linkages. According to India, any inflows of capital that are inimical to 
the domestic industry, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises, and have 
adverse effects on employment would need to be carefully regulated. And, finally, India 
stated that developing countries need to retain the ability to screen and channel foreign 
investment so as to meet their domestic interests and priorities. 
 54
The position that India and other developing countries took in the discussions in the 
WGTI needs to be considered in the context of the initiative taken by the OECD 
countries to formalize a “Multilateral Agreement on Investment,” or MAI. The MAI, a 
draft of which was discussed by OECD Members during 1998–2000, contained far-
reaching proposals aimed at bringing about significant changes to the foreign 
investment regime. It should be pointed out that the proponents of the MAI themselves 
found it difficult to support the initiative at a later stage, and consequently efforts to 
formalize the agreement were abandoned. 
  
Any progress on investment issues at the multilateral level should therefore be mindful 
of problems that were encountered while negotiating the OECD MAI. The major 
roadblock faced in these negotiations stemmed from the sweeping rights that were 
promised to foreign investors. At least three areas were prominent in this regard—
                                               
52 WTO (2001a), p. 4-5. 
53 WTO (2002c). 
54 WTO (2004), paragraph (g). 
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definition of investment, expropriation of investment, and investor-state dispute 
settlement. Our view is that these three areas need to be re-visited in light of the 
growing evidence that is informing a better understanding of the issues involved for 
both the home and the host states. This would help in developing a multilateral regime 
on investment, which besides providing adequate protection to the foreign investor, 
provides the necessary policy options to the host countries to further their development 
objectives. 
4.2.1 Definition 
What constitutes an investment is a key element of an investment treaty for it lays 
down the extent to which foreign investors can get protection against direct and/or 
indirect expropriation in their host countries. Most Bilateral Investment Protection 
Agreements (BIPA) that are currently in operation include a broad definition of 
investment. These treaties usually cover “every kind of asset,” which is typically 
followed by a non-exhaustive list of covered assets. 
Three observations regarding the definition of investment included in the BIPAs should 
be made here. The first is that by agreeing to include forms of investment such as 
“rights to money or to any performance under contract having a financial value”55
While host countries in the developing world, including India, have encountered 
problems with foreign investors over the ambiguous definition of investments that are 
included in their BIPAs, the capital exporting countries have taken steps to overcome 
this problem. These countries have subjected their BIPAs to periodic reviews; the best 
example of which is the US. The US initiated its bilateral investment treaty (BIT) 
programme in 1981 and has reviewed its Model BIT twice in a period of eight years.  
 in the 
definition, host countries have often left the door open for an expansive interpretation of 
what should constitute “investment.” This issue was brought up by the UNCITRAL 
tribunal adjudicating White Industries vs. Republic of India, which is discussed below.  
The first review resulting in the 2004 Model BIT was triggered by the Trade Act of 
2002, which stated, the “principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding 
foreign investment are to reduce or eliminate artificial or trade-distorting barriers to 
foreign investment, while ensuring that foreign investors in the United States are not 
accorded greater substantive rights with respect to investment protections than United 
States investors in the United States ...”56
The second review, the outcome of which is the 2012 US Model BIT, resulted from 
President Obama’s Trade Policy Agenda of 2009 that called for a “review [of] the 
implementation of our FTAs and BITs to ensure that they advance the public interest.”
 (emphasis added).  
57 
This review was driven by yet another set of concerns: “whether [US] FTAs and BITs 
give foreign investors in the United States greater rights than U.S. investors have under 
U.S. law; whether the FTAs and BITs give governments the ‘”regulatory and policy 
space’” needed to protect the environment and the public welfare; and whether an 
investor should have the right to submit to arbitration a claim that a host government 
has breached its investment obligations under an FTA or a BIT.”58
                                               
55 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan and Government of the Republic of 
India for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments of 1996. 
 
56 Trade Act of 2002. 
57 USTR (2009). 
58 For details, see the report of the House of Representatives (2009).  
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The definition of investment appearing in the US Model BIT was comprehensively 
amended in the review undertaken in 2004 and this definition was adopted in the 2012 
BIT as well. The preambular language was changed from “every kind of investment 
owned or controlled directly or indirectly, including equity, debt; and service and 
investment contracts” to “every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or 
indirectly, that has the characteristics of an investment, including such characteristics 
as the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or 
assumption of risk” (emphasis added). At the same time, the forms of involvement of 
foreign enterprises that can receive protection under the BITs were narrowed down 
and, importantly, these bore a direct relationship with the long-term forms of 
participation. 
An appropriate definition of investment will also help to protect a country’s interest in 
the arbitration process. The majority of investment treaty disputes are filed at the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). 59  The ICSID 
Convention does not define investment and its interpretation is left to the tribunals.60 
Providing a broad definition of investment bestows the tribunal with considerable 
discretion in determining whether a particular asset meets the criteria of investment, 
which otherwise may not qualify for investment as per the domestic law.61
4.2.2 Expropriation 
 
Although in common parlance, expropriation of investment is equated with 
nationalization, in the world of BITs this term is used in several different situations. An 
indication of the complexity involving the term “expropriation” (the other term commonly 
used is “takings”) can be gauged from the fact that this term is used by investors 
whenever they find hindrances in their operations in their host countries. UNCTAD 
points out that there can be three broad categories of expropriations: (i) direct 
expropriations include nationalizations and/or outright physical seizure of the property; 
(ii) indirect expropriations which permanently destroy the economic value of the 
investment or deprive the owner of its ability to manage, use or control its property in a 
meaningful way; and (iii) regulatory measures, i.e., acts taken by States in the exercise 
of their right to protect the public interest, which may have the same effects as an 
indirect expropriation.62
All investment treaties provide for expropriation under certain circumstances.  
Investment treaties such as North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), US–
Australia BIT, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)–Australia–New 
Zealand FTA, and India’s BIPAs provide that expropriation of investment is not allowed 
except for public purposes, in a non-discriminatory manner and on payment of fair and 
equitable compensation. It may be pointed out that the definition of investment holds 
the key to the determination of expropriation. Thus, in countries, which have a more 
precise definition of investment (as in the case of the US, discussed above), claims of 
expropriations may be far fewer compared with India. 
 
The investment protection agreements the US has entered into with advanced 
countries, e.g., the NAFTA and the US–Australia BIT, have a significant set of 
exclusions from expropriation, and these relate to intellectual property rights. This 
                                               
59 27 out of 35 disputes in 2007 were filed in ICSID. For details, see IISD (2008).  
60 IISD (2008), page 21. 
61 So far, 279 cases have been registered with ICSID whereas 126 cases have come up in UNCITRAL. 
Out of the 46 new disputes registered in 2011, 34 were with ICSID. For details, see UNCTAD (2012a).  
62 UNCTAD (2012b), page 6. 
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exclusion is also included in the US Model BIT. The relevant article states that 
provisions on expropriation do not “apply to the issuance of compulsory licenses 
granted in relation to intellectual property rights in accordance with the TRIPS 
Agreement, or to the revocation, limitation, or creation of intellectual property rights, to 
the extent that such issuance, revocation, limitation, or creation is consistent with the 
TRIPS Agreement”.63
The customary international law and most of the investment treaties provide for three 
conditions to make the expropriation lawful: it must be for a public purpose, it must be 
non-discriminatory, and compensation must be paid. Some investment treaties such as 
NAFTA, US–Australia FTA, and ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand FTA, provide for a 
fourth parameter, the “due process” (Tienhaara 2010). The indirect expropriation, 
however, is very controversial, as no parameter has been prescribed to judge whether 
an expropriation has taken place. The Model BITs of the US provide for certain criteria 
to decide whether an act amounts to indirect expropriation. They are [among other 
factors] the economic impact of the government action, the extent to which the act 
interferes with the reasonable expectations of the investor, and the character of 
government action.
 Interestingly, this exclusion is absent in the BITs concluded with 
the developing countries. Particularly important in the list of exclusions from 
appropriation is compulsory licence, an instrument that can be used by countries to 
counter excessive use of monopoly rights by patent holders. 
64
4.2.3 Investor-State Dispute 
 
Several commentators have written critically about a number of aspects of the investor-
State dispute mechanism. They have alluded to the “pro-investor” bias of the BITs and 
the process of the investor-State arbitration, including the ability of the courts in the 
host countries to deal with the rulings of the arbitration panels. 
A key feature of the investor-State dispute process is that it gives investors superior 
bargaining power vis-à-vis their host countries. This dimension manifests itself in 
several forms. The first is that the consent of the investor is essential for initiating an 
investor-State dispute under the BITs. Commentators have suggested that this element 
introduces “an inherent pro-investor bias in the system”65 since investors will participate 
only if it is in their interest to participate in the dispute. The ICSID arbitration process 
introduces a second “pro-investor” bias. ICSID Convention does not require an investor 
to exhaust local administrative or judicial remedies as a condition to arbitration, 
whereas a Contracting State may require the exhaustion of such remedies. 
Interestingly, some commentators have justified this dimension of the “pro-investor 
bias” thus: “A foreign investor, justifiably in many instances, will not have confidence in 
the impartiality of the local tribunals and courts in settling any disputes that may arise 
between him and the host state.”66
Commentators have pointed out that the arbitration tribunals are often insulated from 
control by the judicial authorities of the host countries since “investment treaties 
provide that investor-State disputes are to be treated as commercial disputes for the 
purposes of the New York Convention. This restricts the degree to which domestic 
courts can refuse to enforce an investor-State award on the grounds that it goes 
 
                                               
63 The United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement of 2005. 
64 Annex B.4 of US Model BITs 2004 and 2012. 
65 Tienhaara (2009), page 5. 
66 Dodge (2006), page 11. 
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beyond the bounds of commercial arbitration.” 67  The Supreme Court has recently 
overturned a decade old ruling, which had allowed Indian companies to approach 
Indian courts against unfavourable awards by foreign arbitration panels.68 This will give 
a further boost to foreign investors in their disputes with Indian companies and the 
Government of India. What seems more egregious is that the arbitration rules allow 
judicial review of the decisions of the panels based solely on the laws of the country 
where the arbitration is held. Furthermore, in their attempts to create business for the 
arbitration industry, many countries have revised their national laws to provide for less 
vigorous judicial review of foreign arbitration awards. As mentioned above, BITs give 
investors the right to initiate disputes against their host states, so when deciding on a 
jurisdiction investors often opt for locations that limit the judicial review of international 
arbitration. Belgium went as far as removing any kind of judicial oversight by Belgian 
courts on international arbitration awards.69
Controversies over investor-State dispute mechanisms have spilled over into the 
negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA),
 
70 which has been 
described as the 21st century trade agreement by its most prominent protagonist, the 
US. Among the issues figuring in the TPPA negotiations is an investment agreement 
that would have “provisions for expeditious, fair, and transparent investor-State dispute 
settlement …”71 The negotiations on the investment chapter of the TPPA have met with 
strong opposition from Australia, which has rejected the inclusion of investor-State 
mechanisms. In its trade policy statement of 2011, the Gillard Government was against 
“provisions that would confer greater legal rights on foreign businesses than those 
available to domestic businesses.” 72  At the same time, the Government also 
announced that it would no longer seek “inclusion of investor-state dispute resolution 
procedures in trade agreements with developing countries at the behest of Australian 
businesses.” The Gillard Government declared that it “will discontinue this practice”73
This turnaround in Australia’s position was not without reason. The Gillard Government 
had been involved in a dispute over packaging of cigarettes, which it was trying to 
regulate through the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011. The Bill was brought to 
regulate the retail packaging and appearance of tobacco products among others, “to 
increase the effectiveness of health warnings on the retail packaging of tobacco 
. 
                                               
67 The New York Convention, officially known as the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, was concluded in 1958. This treaty offers greater scope for the 
enforcement of international arbitration awards primarily because the Convention dropped the 
requirement that an arbitration award had to comply with the laws of the state in which it was enforced. 
Instead, the Convention maintained that in order to be enforceable, the award had to comply only with 
the laws of the state in which the arbitration was held. This implies that State Parties to the Convention 
“relinquished national judicial control over awards made in other jurisdictions”. For details see, Van 
Harten (2005), p. 605.  
68 Decision dated 6 September 2012 of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Bharat Aluminium 
Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Service (BALCO). 
69 Van Harten (2005). 
70  Countries currently engaged in the TPPA negotiations are Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the US, and Viet Nam. 
71 USTR (2011). 
72 Gillard Government Trade Policy Statement: Trading our way to more jobs and prosperity, April 2011, p. 
14. 
73 This development is interesting because developed countries have always maintained double standards 
with respect to investor-State disputes. While they have insisted on including this provision in their BITs 
with the developing countries, in the very few BITs they have signed amongst themselves this form of 
dispute is either excluded or has not been used in recent years. For details, see Dodge (2006). 
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products.”74 The tobacco giant, Philip Morris Asia Ltd, which controlled the operation of 
its subsidiary in Australia, challenged this legislation. The firm used the investor-State 
dispute provisions of the Australia–Hong Kong, China BIT to challenge the Australian 
Government’s legislation on plain packaging of tobacco products. The reverberations of 
this dispute were heard in the trade policy statement of 2011. The Government 
declared that it “has not and will not accept provisions that limit its capacity to put 
health warnings or plain packaging requirements on tobacco products …”75
4.3 Taming the Non-Tariff Barriers 
 
Since its establishment in 1948, the multilateral trading system has been tasked with 
the elimination of border protection measures arising from the pursuit of discriminatory 
policies. The process of trade liberalization that was thus initiated has since become 
almost synonymous with the lowering of tariffs. Yet, the critical issue of NTBs has 
remained largely unaddressed. The consideration given to this issue appeared to be 
just enough to protect the protagonists of trade liberalization against criticism that they 
were reluctant to ensure distortion-free markets were put in place. The results were 
along expected lines. For a number of decades, GATT had to face the criticism that it 
had established a regime that had worked for the lowering of tariffs while ignoring the 
growing incidence of NTBs. 
WTO could scarcely do any better. Disciplining NTBs was included as a part of the 
negotiations on non-agricultural products. More importantly, the two agreements that 
were explicitly included in the Uruguay Round package for monitoring the growth of 
standards in recent decades have been questioned regarding their effectiveness, and 
were substantially left outside the purview of the current round.  
The Doha Ministerial Declaration was a major departure from the past when it 
mandated the market access negotiations to address the problem of “non-tariff 
barriers” instead of the more ubiquitous “non-tariff measures” that had been included in 
previous mandates. This change in nomenclature had two significant dimensions. First, 
the focus on NTBs could be considered a step towards clarifying the scope of the 
negotiations. As discussed above, the focus of the Uruguay Round market negotiations 
on NTBs created the problem in that several of the “non-tariff measures” were being 
discussed in other negotiating groups, and this created jurisdictional overlaps. The 
second dimension, and one which caused a new set of problems, was that the 
Declaration gave no guidance as to how NTBs would be identified. In fact, much of the 
negotiating capital has been devoted to defining the scope of the negotiating mandate 
on NTBs. 
4.3.1 Defining the scope of NTBs 
In one of the early submissions to Negotiating Group on Market Access (NGMA), New 
Zealand focused on this issue in a systematic manner, pointing out that the top seven 
of the so-called NTBs identified by its exporters included those that could, on 
examination, be found to be “WTO-legal.”76
                                               
74 Article 3 of the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011. For details, see Parliament of Australia (2011). 
 They included standards and certification, 
customs procedures, food safety and health requirements. To obviate this problem, 
New Zealand suggested the scope of the negotiations on NTBs could be defined using 
75 Gillard Government Trade Policy Statement: Trading our way to more jobs and prosperity. April 2011, 
page 14. 
76 WTO (2002d). 
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the following classifications: (a) issues that might be addressed in negotiations 
elsewhere under the Doha mandate; (b) issues or proposals involving substantial 
change to existing WTO agreements; (c) proposals involving clarification of existing 
rules; (d) issues involving disputed interpretation of rules; (e) issues open to bilateral 
resolution; (f) products of interest to developing countries; (g) capacity issues; (h) 
implementation issues; and (i) special and differential provisions.  
Canada provided similar guidance on defining the scope of the negotiations on NTBs, 
based on the views expressed by the country’s exporters.77
India made yet another suggestion, which addressed a more specific issue concerning 
the developing countries.
 Canada identified four sets 
of so-called NTBs. These were: (a) quotas; (b) import licensing, rules of origin, customs 
valuation, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), and technical barriers to trade 
(TBT); (c) tariff classification; (d) border-related measures including customs 
procedures, fees and administration. Of these four categories, Canada’s view was that 
the NTB negotiations could take up only the first set of issues, since all the other sets 
included issues that either were a part of existing WTO agreements or were being 
negotiated in other negotiating groups.  
78
A parallel process for identifying NTBs was initiated by the NGMA chairman in 2002. 
This process resulted in the submission of a large number of notifications in which 
WTO Members identified the NTBs their exporters were facing.
 In India’s view, legitimate instruments that developing 
countries might use under the various WTO agreements for development of their 
industries should not be included as NTBs. For example, export tariffs or levies are 
generally used to generate resources to develop an industry by diversification in the 
product profile and development of value-added products for export. India, therefore, 
suggested that “export duties be negotiated ... outside the Doha mandate.”  
79
In their submissions, members identified three sets of NTBs that, in their view, were 
outside the purview of the NTB negotiations being conducted by NGMA. These were: 
(a) NTBs related to existing WTO agreements (e.g., customs valuation, import 
licensing,  SPS, and TBT) that are not subject to a specific negotiating mandate; (b) 
NTBs related to other WTO agreements that are also the subject of a negotiating 
mandate (e.g., Anti Dumping and Countervailing Duties); (c) NTBs that are already part 
of the Doha Declaration (e.g., trade facilitation, transparency in government 
procurement, and services).  
 
Members identified the relevant GATT/WTO Articles/Agreements that could be applied 
to the NTBs thus identified. The NTB categories with the highest incidence of 
notifications were TBTs (530 NTB entries, almost half the total), customs and 
administrative procedures (380 entries), and SPS (137 entries). Quantitative 
restrictions, trade remedies, government participation in trade, charges on imports and 
barriers falling under the other groups accounted for less than 5% of total NTB entries. 
Interestingly, SPS measures were also identified as NTBs.  
Nearly four decades after the initiation of a multilateral negotiation on the reduction of 
NTMs for free global trade and enhancing market access, the world is now facing one 
of its most difficult and complex regimes. Since the establishment of the WTO in 1995, 
both the number of TBTs and the spread of such measures across the Member 
countries are fast outstripping and undermining the trade liberalization achieved by way 
                                               
77 WTO (2002e). 
78 WTO (2002f). 
79 Between 2003 and 2006, 24 notifications were issued under the series TN/MA/W/46. 
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of tariff reduction and elimination. As the table below clearly shows, the use of TBTs by 
WTO Member countries has been on the rise, especially under the WTO regime. In 
1995, 389 TBT notifications were issued, which went up to nearly 2,200 in 2012.  
Table 6: Use of Technical Barriers to Trade by WTO Members, 1995–2012 
Years OECD countries Non-OECD countries Total Notifications 
1995 348 41 389 
1996 395 105 500 
1997 305 195 500 
1998 491 189 680 
1999 436 260 696 
2000 428 202 630 
2001 294 278 572 
2002 325 295 620 
2003 380 513 893 
2004 341 377 718 
2005 381 519 900 
2006 391 643 1,034 
2007 498 737 1,235 
2008 621 959 1,580 
2009 740 1,160 1,900 
2010 708 1,172 1,880 
2011 735 1,032 1,767 
2012 832 1,346 2,178 
 
Source: WTO. 
As the table shows, the number of TBT notifications issued has increased consistently 
except in the years affected by the downturn at the end of the 1990s and 2000s. A 
more noteworthy feature of TBT notifications is the steep increase in the number of 
countries that have been involved in issuing notifications. In 1995, only 26 of the 123 
WTO Members issued TBT notifications, but by 2012, 74 Members were active in 
issuing TBT notifications. Quite obviously, the increase in the number of countries 
active in terms of issuing TBT notifications was due to increased interest shown by 
non-OECD countries, a large proportion of which are developing countries. Again, the 
number of these countries that issued TBT notifications far outstripped the OECD 
countries. This phenomenon is illustrated by the following figure showing trends in TBT 
notifications. In 1995, the share in the total notifications issued of non-OECD countries 
was below 10%. But by 2012 the share of those same countries had increased to more 
than 60%. The emergence of non-OECD countries as new players in the application of 
TBTs is reflected in the increased number of notifications made by them—from 41 in 
1995 to almost 1,350 in 2012.  
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Figure 2: Trends in Technical Barriers to Trade Notifications Across 
Country Groups 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Negotiations in the Doha Round face formidable challenges primarily because the 
negotiating process has been beset with problems. As indicated in this paper, 
negotiations in agriculture and NAMA had been fast-tracked, while critical areas like 
services and intellectual property rights remained on the back-burner. Although 
agriculture and NAMA negotiations have shown some progress, the impetus for 
concluding the negotiations seems to be eluding the negotiators since the major 
players are still in disagreement over some of the most critical issues. 
Services negotiations have made the least progress both in the area of market access 
and rules. The complexities of negotiating market access possibilities across the 12 
services sectors together with the framing of an array of rules, have contributed to the 
slow progress. At various points in the negotiating process, attempts were made to 
initiate plurilateral negotiations involving the principal demandeurs of services trade 
liberalization. However, a wide gulf in the expectations of these countries prevented 
any forward movement. 
The Doha Round has unequivocally shown that there are inherent risks in conducting 
comprehensive trade deals at the multilateral level, arising at two levels. Firstly, the 
architects of the Doha Round provided a mandate for arriving at a balanced outcome, 
taking into consideration the results of all the negotiating areas. The second problem 
was that the WTO was called upon to address a number of behind-the-border issues 
as well as non-trade concerns while re-designing a number of key Uruguay Round 
agreements. These problems would suggest that the Doha Round could be suffering 
from a design flaw, which needs to be rectified to be able to advance. 
Another significant issue which is part of this thinking on the way forward should be the 
new dynamics of trade that have been set in motion by the emergence of global 
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production networks. It has been argued that these networks have helped markets to 
integrate in an efficient manner and that there is need on the part of policymakers to 
find ways of supporting them. In this paper, we have indicated a few areas which need 
careful policy intervention for the strengthening of global production networks. This is a 
task the WTO Members could set themselves as they prepare for the Bali Ministerial 
Conference. 
Annex Table: List of tariff Sectoral Initiatives Proposed 
Sectoral Initiative Participants 
Automotives and related parts Japan 
Bicycle and related parts Singapore; Switzerland; Taipei,China; Thailand 
Chemicals Canada; the European Communities; Japan; Norway; Singapore; Switzerland; Taipei,China; United States 
Electronics/ electrical products Hong Kong, China; Japan; Republic of Korea; Singapore; Thailand; United States 
Fish and fish products Canada; Hong Kong, China; Iceland; New Zealand; Norway; Oman; Singapore; Thailand; Uruguay 
Forest products Canada; Hong Kong, China; New Zealand; Singapore; Switzerland; Thailand; United States 
Gems and jewellery 
Canada; the European Communities; Hong Kong, China; 
Japan; Norway; Singapore; Switzerland; Taipei,China; 
Thailand; United States 
Hand tools Taipei,China 
Open access to enhanced 
healthcare Singapore; Switzerland; Taipei,China; United States 
Raw materials United Arab Emirates 
Industrial machinery  Canada; the European Communities; Japan; Norway; Singapore; Switzerland; Taipei,China; United States 
Sports equipment Norway; Singapore, Switzerland; Taipei,China; United States 
Textiles, clothing, and footwear European Communities 
Toys Hong Kong, China; Taipei,China 
 
Source: WTO (2008), Fourth Revision of Draft Modalities for Non-Agricultural Market Access, 
TN/MA/W/103/Rev.3, 6 December, Annex 7. 
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